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PENNIES FROM HEAVEN-WHY WASHINGTON LEGAL
FOUNDATION V. LEGAL FOUNDATION OF WASHINGTON
VIOLATES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Kristi L. Darnell
Abstract: In Washington Legal Foundationv. Legal Foundationof Washington, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that Washington's Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account
(IOLTA) program did not perpetuate a "taking without just compensation" in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. Even though the court acknowledged that IOLTA-generated interest was
client property, the first element necessary to establish a taking, it reasoned that the
appropriate subsequent analysis for this problem was the ad hoc test. Applying the ad hoc test
to the IOLTA program, the court concluded that the requisite unconstitutional elements were
absent. This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly analyzed the IOLTA issue and
instead should have applied the more appropriate per se takings analysis, resulting in an
automatic finding of an unconstitutional taking. Finally, this Note suggests constitutionally
valid alternatives to the IOLTA program that would continue to fund Washington's important
legal aid organizations.

For more than fifteen years, Washington's public legal aid
organizations have enjoyed approximately three million dollars annually
in "free money" generated by this state's Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts program (IOLTA).' This free money is earmarked to provide
free or low cost legal assistance to those who would otherwise have no
access to the justice system.2 At first glance, the idea appears to be
genius. Client owned monies that are presumed to be incapable of
earning interest alone because they are either too small or held for too
short a period of time are pooled through governmental regulation and
together do in fact generate income.3 This money is then automatically
donated to the Legal Foundation of Washington (LFW), a charitable
organization created by the Supreme Court of Washington to distribute
the IOLTA-generated interest to various legal aid groups throughout the
state.4 While the goals of this program are worthy, the mechanism is
unconstitutional.'
1. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash, 271 F.3d 835 app. at 870 (9th Cir. 2001),
cert. granted 70 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. June 10, 2002) (No. 01-1325). [hereinafter Legal Found. of
Wash. 11].
2. Id. at 869.
3. Id
4. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT, 1.14(c)(1) (2001).
A lawyer who receives client funds shall maintain a pooled interest-bearing trust account for
deposit of client funds that are nominal in amount or expected to be held for a short period of
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The plain language of the Fifth Amendment is simple, but the
jurisprudence surrounding the interpretation of the takings phrase "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation ' 6 is complex. 7 The crux of the IOLTA issue lies in the
choice of takings analyses---either per se or ad hoc.8 Courts apply the per
se takings approach when the government mandates a permanent
physical occupation of the property9 or when it denies all economically
viable uses of the property." Both of these government actions
automatically result in a taking, regardless of the minimal economic
impact or the charitable intention of the government regulation." On the
other hand, the ad hoc takings analysis employs a multi-factor balancing
test to determine whether a regulation has gone too far.'2 Courts apply
the ad hoc analysis to situations where a portion of something, but
neither the entire property nor all of its economic value, has been
appropriated. 13
In Washington Legal Foundationv. Legal Foundationof Washington.
[hereinafter Legal Founation. of Washington II], 4 the Ninth Circuit, en
banc, failed to apply the correct test. While acknowledging that IOLTAgenerated interest is the private property of the client, the court
nevertheless stated that the per se analysis was inappropriate outside of
the real property context. 5 Furthermore, the court stated that the ad hoc
balancing test was created for this very situation, where the government
time. The interest accruing on this account, net of reasonable check and deposit processing
charges which shall only include items deposited charge, monthly maintenance fee, per item
check charge, and per deposit charge, shall be paid to The Legal Foundation of Washington, as
established by the Supreme Court of Washington. All other fees and transaction costs shall be
paid by the lawyer. A lawyer may, but shall not be required to, notify the client of the intended
use of such funds.
5. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 182-83 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding Texas IOLTA program, comparable in structure to Washington's IOLTA program,
unconstitutional).
6. U.S. Const., amend. V.
7. See generally Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Legal Found. of Wash. II, 271 F.3d 835, 854 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted 70
U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. June 10, 2002) (No. 01-1325).
9. Loretto, 458 U.S. 441.
10. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n., 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
13. Id.
14. 271 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2001).
15. ld. at854

Washington's IOLTA Program
adjusts the benefits and burdens for the common good.16 However, the
Ninth Circuit should have applied the per se analysis as suggested by
precedent, 7 instead of the ad hoc balancing test." If the court had
employed the correct test, it would have been compelled to rule that the
IOLTA program in its present form was unconstitutional. 9
Although the Ninth Circuit held Washington State's IOLTA program
was not unconstitutional,2" this issue is by no means resolved
nationwide.2' Because the Texas IOLTA program was declared
unconstitutional by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals only weeks
earlier,'a the Ninth Circuit decision created a split among the circuits, and
the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide the
issue.' When the Court hears this case, it should find that, contrary to the
Ninth Circuit's decision, the forced donation of IOLTA-generated
interest earned on client monies is a "taking without just compensation"
under the Fifth Amendment, and is therefore unconstitutional.
Because the goals of the IOLTA program are both worthy and
commendable, advocates for publicly supported indigent legal services
should look to a constitutionally acceptable reform of this program,
thereby continuing to fulfill a crucial societal need without
compromising important constitutional values. There are a number of
other avenues that the Washington State Supreme Court, the Washington
State Bar Association, and the state's attorneys themselves can and
should pursue to meet these funding needs, including making the
program voluntary or levying a fee.24
This Note shows that the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Legal Found. of
Wash. 1I is fatally flawed. Part I explores the general history and
development of IOLTA programs throughout the country and
specifically in Washington State. Part II examines the development of
16. Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 852-53.
17. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 186-87 (5th
Cir. 2001) (stating that Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) compels use of Loretto
per se test for evaluating IOLTA programs).
18. Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 857-61.
19. See, e.g., Tex Equal Access to Justice Found, 270 F.3d at 185.
20. Legal Found.of Wiash. li, 271 F.3d 835.
21. See generally Tex Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180 (holding IOLTA program
unconstitutional).

22. Id.
23. Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. June
10, 2002) (No. 01-1325).
24. See infra Part V.D.
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the initial takings question-whether interest income is property. Part III
provides a brief overview of the jurisprudence surrounding the takings
analysis and addresses the post-PhillipsIOLTA circuit decisions. Part IV
details the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Legal Found. of Wash. II.
Finally, Part V analyzes the proper application of the takings test, argues
that the IOLTA program works an unconstitutional taking of clients'
private property, and suggests constitutionally valid alternatives.
I.

INTEREST ON LAWYER TRUST ACCOUNT PROGRAMS

Washington's IOLTA program, like the IOLTA programs currently
present in all fifty states,' was created with charitable and ethical goals
in mind.26 The program evolved out of the strict ethical rules that have
always surrounded the handling of client funds by attorneys.27 It has long
been absolutely forbidden to commingle client funds with law firm or
lawyer monies. 28 This prohibition includes all client owned monies that
come within the lawyer's possession, including, for example, settlement
funds and retainer fees.29
To obey these ethical rules, lawyers generally maintained separate
trust accounts for client funds.3" Client funds commonly had to be
available at any time on the client's demand, so attorneys placed these
funds in demand checking accounts (as opposed to interest-bearing
savings accounts). 31 Therefore, lawyers only deposited sums of money
expected to generate substantial amounts of interest in interest-bearing
savings accounts on the rationale that the convenience of a checking
32
account was only outweighed by a substantial amount of interest.
Because pre-1980 banking laws did not allow for the payment of interest
25. See Bryan C. Goldstein, Case Comment, Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation: The
Future oflOLTA, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1999).
26. See Legal Found. of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 843, ("An ethical tradition of the legal profession is
the provision of legal services to those who cannot afford to pay them.").
27. See, e.g., CANONS OF PROF'L EThiCS, C. I1 (as amended 1933).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr, R. 1.15(a)(1999):
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third party persons that is in a lawyer's possession in
connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept
in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere
with the consent of the client or third person.
29. Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 867-68.
30. Id.
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSimrrY, DR 9-102 (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, R. 1.15 (1998).

32. Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 842. (emphasis added).

Washington's IOLTA Program
on demand checking accounts, 33 client trust accounts essentially
functioned as interest-free loans to banks.34
As interest rates rose to all-time highs in the late 1970s, many banking
regulations were altered.35 In 1980, Congress authorized the use of
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts, and the
transformation of the banking industry began. 36 NOW accounts are
interest-bearing checking accounts subject to one major caveat-all
interest earned on these accounts must be donated to charitable
organizations.37 While clients were still unable to access the interest, the
interest could be used to support legal services, so long as a charitable
' Even so, shortorganization had the "exclusive right to the interest."38
term and small funds remained incapable of earning interest beyond the
administrative costs of establishing separate NOW accounts. 39 Therefore,
lawyers generally continued to place client funds in non-interest bearing
checking accounts.'W
The advent of NOW accounts set the stage for the IOLTA program.41
In 1981, Florida became the first state to establish an IOLTA system.42
Today, IOLTA programs are present in some form in all fifty states and
the District of Columbia.43 Generally, IOLTA programs were introduced
through a state's supreme court, and made applicable to all licensed
attorneys through a state's Bar Association." These programs typically
dictate that upon receipt of client monies, an attorney then determines
whether the funds will presumably be incapable of generating interest on
their own.4 Those funds that are incapable of generating interest must be
33. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 371a,

1464(b)(1)(B), 1828(g) (1998)).
34. Legal Found. of Wash. II, 271 F.3d at 842.
35. Id. at 842-43.
36. Phillips,524 U.S. at 161.
37. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (1980)).
38. Id.
39. Legal Found.of Wash. I, 271 F.3d at 842-43. The costs include bank charges, as well as
lawyer and accountant fees for setting up the accounts. Id. at 844.
40. Kevin H. Douglas, Note, IOLTAs Unmasked: LegalAid Programs'FundingResults in Taking
of ClientsProperty,50 VAND. L REv. 1297, 1301 (1997).
41. Phillips,524 U.S. at 161.
42. Katherine Elrich, Note, Equal Justice Under the Law (If You Can Afford It): Fifth Circuit
Threatens Texas' IOLTA Program,28 TEX. TECH L REV. 887, 894 (1997).
43. See Goldstein, supra note 25, at 1277 (stating program names vary slightly from state to
state).
44. See Legal Found. of Wash. 11,271 F.3d 835 app. at 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
45. See, e.g., WASH. RULEs oFPROF'L CoNDucrR. 1.14(2000).
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placed in a designated IOLTA account, where the bank will pool client
monies and generate interest on the collective funds. 6 That interest is
then donated directly to a charitable organization designated by the state
bar association or the state supreme court. While clients may be aware
of the IOLTA program," their authorization of the use of their principal
and interest is not required so long as the attorney has determined that
the principal will be incapable of generating interest on its own.49
Washington State's IOLTA program was created in 1984 by the
Supreme Court of Washington" and subsequently codified in the
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct." Interest generated from
IOLTA accounts must be donated directly to the Legal Foundation of
Washington, a non-profit organization established to grant funds to
various non-profit legal aid programs throughout the state.52 Only when
the interest generated on client funds is expected to exceed the
administrative costs, including bank charges and attorney fees to
establish separate interest bearing accounts, should the money be
deposited in a separate, non-IOLTA,interest-bearing account where
interest is payable to the client.5 3 In other words, a client will receive
interest income only when an attorney can predict that a net profit will
result.5 However, if the client funds alone are presumed incapable of
generating a net interest for the client, the administrative pooling of
money in the IOLTA account creates interest that is donated to the Legal
Foundation of Washington.55
II.

EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE IOLTA PROGRAM UNDER
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Despite what at first glance seems to be an ingenious idea to derive
interest from otherwise barren funds, there have been numerous Fifth

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Legal Found of Wash. II, 271 F.3d at 869.
Id.
See WASH. Rums OF PROF'L CONDUCr, 1.14(c)(1) (2001).
Id.
Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 869.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.

Washington's IOLTA Program
Amendment takings challenges to IOLTA programs across the country.56
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that no "private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."5' The plain language
of the Amendment has been interpreted to mean that a court must find
three elements in order to conclude that a regulation constitutes a taking:
1) the regulation must take private property, 2) the property must be
taken for public use, and 3) the taking must lack the payment of just
compensation. 8 It is important to note that the Fifth Amendment does
not prohibit the taking of private property for public use-instead, it only
requires that just compensation be paid. 59
Initially, these IOLTA challenges failed because courts systematically
ruled that IOLTA-generated interest was not the personal property of
clients. Therefore, there was no need to engage in further Fifth
Amendment takings analysis." However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recently held that IOLTA-generated interest is to be considered personal
property of clients.61
A.

Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith

Although not an IOLTA case, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v.
Beckwith62 has been used by analogy to address the question of whether
interest income is private property under the Fifth Amendment.63 In
Webb's, the trial court required one of the parties to deposit almost
$2,000,000 with the clerk of the court in an interpleader action.'
Because a Florida statute required that interest be accrued on interpleader
funds, the money was deposited into an interest-bearing account.65After
one year, the funds generated $100,000 in interest.6 6 The trial court

56. See generally Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Wash. Legal Found. v.
Mass. State Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (lst Cir. 1993); Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002 (1lth
Cir. 1987).
57. U.S. Cost. amend. V.
58. See id.
59. See Legal Found.of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 851-52.
60. See, e.g., Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004-05; Mass. State BarFound., 993 F.2d at 973-74.
61. Phillips,524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
62. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
63. See generally Phillips, 524 U.S. 156; Mass. State BarFound., 993 F.2d at 973-74; Cone, 819
F.2d 1002.
64. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 156-57.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 158.

781

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:775, 2002

retained the interest and returned the principal to the victorious party. 67
Not surprisingly, the retention of such a large amount of interest raised
alarm among the owners of the principal, and the case was eventually
heard before the U.S. Supreme Court.68 Following the rule that "[t]he
earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are
property just as the fund itself is property,"6 9 the Court held that the
interest earned on the interpleader account was the private property of
the owner of that principal.7"
While the Webb's court clearly set the standard of takings law as it
applied to interest income in general, many subsequent courts
considering the IOLTA issue have noted that there are two important
distinguishing factors.7 First, Webb's was not about IOLTA issues, but
instead addressed the interest earned on interpleader accounts.72 While
there are clearly some analogies between the two, the largest difference
is the fact that the interpleader amount generated interest on its own,
while IOLTA principals would not.73 Second, the size of the principal
involved in Webb's was considerably larger than the IOLTA amounts at
issue, and while the interest earned on IOLTA accounts individually is
virtually non-existent, in Webb's it amounted to more than $100,000.74
The way courts have addressed these potential differences has greatly
affected the outcome of the subsequent IOLTA takings challenges.75
B.

Pre-PhillipsApplication of Webb's to IOLTA.

The first IOLTA constitutional challenge took place in Cone v. State
76
Bar of Florida.
As would be repeated in the many subsequent IOLTA
challenges, the plaintiff in Cone asserted that the appropriation of interest

67. Id.
68. Id. at 155.
69. Id. at 162.
70. Id. See infra Section V.B. (discussing that the Court came to this conclusion by employing the
analysis used in Causby, the precursor to the Loretto per se test, and rejected the Penn Central ad
hoc test).
71. See, e.g., Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002, 1007 (1lth Cir. 1998); Wash. Legal
Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 975-76 (1st Cir. 1993).
72. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 155.
73. See id. By law only amounts that are presumed to be incapable of generating interest on their

own are placed in IOLTA accounts. See, e.g., WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, 1.14(c)(1) (2001).
74. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 158.
75. See supra,note 71 and accompanying text.
76. 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).
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generated on her principal was unconstitutional because she had not been
justly compensated.77 Similarly, in 1993, the First Circuit addressed the
IOLTA takings issue in Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts
Bar Foundation.8 In both cases, the circuit courts, in distinguishing the
Webb's analysis, found that the respective IOLTA programs did not
constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 9 The Cone court found
that the interest at issue was far too small to come under the Webb's
analysis-$13.75 at issue in Cone, compared with approximately
$100,000 at issue in Webb's.80 Similarly, the Massachusetts Bar
Foundation court distinguished Webb's on the basis that it was not an
IOLTA case and that the plaintiffs involved in Webb's had a recognized
property right in the interest income, while the principal holders of
IOLTA funds did not.8
At the base of both the First and Eleventh Circuit cases was the idea
that IOLTA-generated interest was not the private property of the
client.82 Both courts essentially stopped the takings analysis at this point
because all three elements of a taking must be present in order to find a
constitutional violation.83 However, these early federal challenges to the
IOLTA program would no longer be valid once the U.S. Supreme Court
took up the IOLTA issue in Phillips.8 4
C.

Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation

Undeterred by its defeat in the First Circuit, the Washington Legal
Foundation'
again
IOLTAclaimed
program,relief
this time
taking
the
86 attacked
battle in Texas.
Again, the
plaintiffs
under
the upFifth

77. Id.
at 1004.
78. 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
79. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007; Mass. BarFound., 993 F.2d at 973-74.
80. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006-07.
81. Mass. Bar Found.,993 F.2d at 975.
82. Id.; Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007.
83. Mass. BarFound,993 F.2d at 975.
84. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
85. The "Washington Legal Foundation" organization is a self-proclaimed advocate for "freedom
and justice. ...[working to] maintain balance in the Courts and [to] help our government strengthen
America's free enterprise system:' See http.//www.wlf.org (last visited July 31, 2002).
86. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. I (W.D. Tex.
1995), aff'd in part, vacated in part,rev'd in part and remanded, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), aff'd,
remanded 524 U.S. 156 (1998), 86 F. Supp. 2d 617 (W.D. Tex. 2000), rev'd and remanded 270 F.3d
180 (5th Cir. 2001).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:775, 2002

Amendment. 7 The District Court followed the rationale developed in the
First and the Eleventh Circuits, holding that IOLTA-generated interest
was not the private property of the client.88 However, when the Fifth
Circuit addressed the issue, it interpreted Webb's to mandate a holding
that IOLTA interest was the personal property of the client. 89 Further, the
"Webb's decision ...creates a rule that is independent of the amount or
value of [the] interest at issue."9
The U.S. Supreme Court took up the IOLTA issue in Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation91 to resolve the resulting circuit split. 92
Because the Fifth Circuit had ruled that IOLTA-generated interest was
the private property of the client, the Supreme Court only considered this
narrow issue,93 and did not reach the broader issue of whether the IOLTA
program was a taking. 94 Still, the Court was sharply divided on this issue
and a 5-4 decision resulted. 95 The case generated two dissenting
opinions, each of which was joined by all dissenters.9 6
The Phillips majority affirmed the Fifth Circuit, holding that the
interest generated by the IOLTA program was the private property of the
client.97 While the Court recognized that a State is generally at liberty to
establish property rights, it found that "at least as to confiscatory
regulations.., a State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by
disavowing traditional property interest long recognized under state
law."98 Because Texas common law had long recognized the maxim that
"interest follows principal," the Court concluded that under Texas law,
the IOLTA-generated interest was the private property of the owner of
the principal.99
The majority also rejected the defendants' argument that there could
be no property rights in IOLTA-generated interest because the client

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See Tex. EqualAccess to JusticeFound., 873 F. Supp at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Tex. EqualAccess to Justice Found., 94 F.3d at 1002.
Id.
524 U.S. 156 (1998).
Id. at 157.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 164, n.4.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 164, 166-67.
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deposits alone could not independently earn interest.10 The Court noted
that it had "never held that a physical item is not 'property' simply
because it lack[ed] a positive economic or market value."' ' 1 In fact, the
Court noted that there are many non-economic property rights including
the ability to possess, control, and dispose of property. According to the
Court, these property rights belong to the owner of the principal. 02
Finally, after deciding that IOLTA interest was indeed private
property, the Court discussed in a cursory manner the remaining takings
analysis.1"3 In dicta, the majority noted that a "property right [can be]
taken even when infringement of that right arguably increased the
market value of the property at issue."'' 4 Therefore, the argument that the
IOLTA program itself actually added value to the principal should be
irrelevant in determining whether a taking is present. 5 In addition, the
Court indirectly analogized the Loretto per se test to the IOLTA
context." 6
Thus, the Supreme Court has resolved the first issue in the IOLTA
takings analysis. The interest earned in IOLTA accounts is indeed the
private property of the client. After Phillips,the circuit courts were faced
with the challenge of determining whether this private property was
actually taken, and if so, whether just compensation for such a taking
was possible.
III. AD HOC V. PER SE ANALYSIS-CIRCUITS CONSIDER
POST-PHILLIPSFIFTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO
IOLTA PROGRAMS
In Phillips, the U.S. Supreme Court established that IOLTA-generated
interest was indeed the private property of the client. 7 Going no further,
the Court left the analysis of the remaining two takings factors, whether
the property was taken and whether just compensation was due, for the

100. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 171 (noting that "it is not that the client funds to be placed in IOLTA
accounts cannot generate interest, but that they cannot generate net interest").
101. Id. at 169.

102. ld. at 170.
103. Id. at 170-72.
104. Id.at 170 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 437 n.15
(1982)) (emphasis in original).
105. See if.
106. Id
107. Id. at 160.
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circuit courts to interpret.' 8 The circuit courts have split on these issues
and the cases turn on the particular analysis that each employs. 9 The
Fifth Circuit has adopted the per se analysis, automatically finding that
the Texas IOLTA program was unconstitutional."0 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit opted to use the ad hoc balancing test and ruled that
Washington's program was constitutional."'
A.

Ad Hoc and PerSe Analyses of Fifth Amendment Takings Claims

Generally, Fifth Amendment takings issues are resolved on a case-bycase basis." 2 However, recent case law has created a number of broad
propositions," 3 and two forms of takings analysis have been
recognized." 4 To determine whether a taking is present, the questionable
action at issue will be subjected to either an ad hoc analysis or a per se
analysis." 5 Generally, an ad hoc takings analysis applies when the
subject regulation denies the property owner of less than the total value
of the property." 6 In cases applying the ad hoc test, a number of factors
are balanced to determine whether the regulation has gone too far."7 In
contrast, the per se takings analysis applies when it appears that the
property owner has been denied all economically viable use of the
property or where there is a permanent physical occupation of the
property."' If the per se analysis is applicable, an automatic taking will
be found, regardless of any other factors a court might ordinarily
consider under the ad hoc test, including the legitimacy of the state
interest or the economic impact of the regulation." 9
108. Id. at 172.
109. See Legal Found. of Wash. II, 271 F.3d 835, 857-61 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted 70
U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. June 10, 2002) (No. 01-1325) (applying the ad hoc takings analysis). But see
Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 186-88 (5th Cir. 2001)
(applying the per se takings analysis).
110. Tex Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d at 186-88.
111. Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 857-61.
112. See id.
113. J. David Breemer, Comment, IOLTA in the New Millennium: Slowly Sinking Under the
Weight of the Takings Clause, 23 HAwAII L. REv. 221, 225 (2000).
114. Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 854.
115. Id.
116. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
119. See, e.g., Loretto,458 U.S. at 434-35.
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1.

Ad Hoc Takings

The evolutionary development of ad hoc takings jurisprudence began
with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,120 when Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes stated for the majority that "while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if [the] regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. 121 In this case, a group of homeowners sued to prevent the
Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under their property and
removing the subjacent support of their homes and surrounding land."
Although the homeowners had previously contracted with the coal
company to allow this mining operation, the state subsequently enacted a
regulation preventing mining companies from undermining the subjacent
support of existing surface structures." As a result, a conflict developed
between the state's police power to regulate and the private property
rights of the Pennsylvania Coal Company. 24 Balancing these competing
interests, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the regulation went too far
and infringed on the mining company's constitutionally protected
property rights."z
With the holding in Pennsylvania Coal as its starting point, the U.S.
Supreme Court further refined the ad hoc takings analysis in Penn
Central TransportationCo. v. New York City."2 Penn Central involved
the New York City's regulation of the Grand Central Terminal as a
historic landmark, requiring city authorization for any fundamental
alteration to the building.Y When the owner sought authorization for
plans to build a multistory office building over the terminal, the city
denied this use as contrary to the building's historic character." 8 In
response, the owner requested compensation for his lost profit
arguing
129
that the city's regulation worked as an unconstitutional taking.

120. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
121. MLat 416. ("We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change.").
122. Id. at412.
123. Id,at412-13.
124. Id. at413.
125. Id. at 413-14.
126. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

127. Id. at 115.
128. Id. at 117.
129. Id. at 119.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:775, 2002

The Supreme Court first stated generally that when the regulation goes
so far as to "forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness, and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,"' 30 a
taking occurs. The Court in Penn Central set forth the modern ad hoc
balancing test for analyzing whether a regulatory taking has occurred: 1)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, 2) the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with investment-backed expectations,
and 3) the character of the government action in establishing the
regulation.'13 In applying these factors to the facts of the Penn Central
case, the Court held that the regulation did not work as an
unconstitutional taking. 32 Because the regulation allowed the owners to
continue their present13use
of the property, it did not go too far and was
3
permissible.
therefore
2.

PerSe Takings

In contrast, the per se takings analysis has traditionally been applied in
situations where there is a permanent physical invasion 34 or a complete
denial of economically viable use'35 of the subject property. The U.S.
Supreme Court first established the parameters of the per se takings
analysis in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,3 6 and later
131
expanded the analysis in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council.
In Loretto, the Court determined that a permanent physical invasion
occurred when a plaintiff landlord was required to allow the installation
of cable television lines in her building.'38 While the cable wires were
small and occupied only a minute area of the roof,'39 these lines
nevertheless constituted a per se violation of the takings clause,
'
regardless
of the "public
wires] Because
might serve
or the
"minimal economic
impactinterest
on the [the
owner."''
the permanent

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 128-34.
Id.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,430,434-35 (1982).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-19 (1992).
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422.
Id. at 422.
See id. at 426.
Id. at 435, 438.
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physical occupation resulted in an automatic taking, there was no need to
engage in any balancing of various factors. 142 In addition, the Court noted
that to the extent the regulation caused a permanent occupation of the
property, it effectively destroyed the rights "to possess, use and dispose"
that are compensable property rights. 4 3 Loretto is now considered the
appropriate analysis to determine whether per se takings violations are
present.1"
The Supreme Court, building on the holding in Loretto, held in Lucas
that a per se taking was also present when an owner was denied all
"economically viable use" of his or her property. 45 The plaintiff had
purchased two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island with the
intention of building single-family homes similar to those located on
adjacent plots. 1 46 However, prior to the commencement of construction,
the State legislature enacted a statute designed to protect the beach. 47
The legislation prohibited the erection of permanent habitable buildings
on these two plots.148 The Court reasoned that from the property owner's
point of view, "the total deprivation of beneficial use.. . [is the]
equivalent of a physical appropriation."' 4 9 Because the Plaintiff was
completely denied any economically viable use of the land, the Court
held that there had been a per se taking for which just compensation was
due."' Therefore, the per se analysis must result in an automatic holding
that a taking occurred where there has been a permanent physical
invasion or a regulation that denies all economically viable use.
B.

CircuitApplication of the Takings Analysis to IOLTA Challenges

The Fifth and Ninth Circuits both applied the established takings
jurisprudence to determine the constitutionality of the IOLTA program,
but arrived at very different conclusions. The Fifth Circuit found that the
per se approach was most appropriate, and held the IOLTA program

142.
143.
144.
145.

lIdat 434-35.
Id at 435 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
Legal Found. of Wash. R, 271 F.3d 835, 854 (9th Cir. 2001).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).

146. Id.at 1006-07.
147. lId at 1007-09.

148. Id at 1007.
149. Idat 1017.
150. Id. at 1019, 1028.
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unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, applied the ad hoc
approach, and held the IOLTA program to be legal.
1.

The Fifth Cicrcuit'sDecision in Washington Legal Foundation v.
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation.

After the Phillipsdecision, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case
to the trial court to determine and apply the appropriate takings
analysis. 151 A federal district court held in Washington Legal Foundation
v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundationt52that the Texas IOLTA
program was constitutional, despite the fact that the interest generated
was the private property of the client. 153 The district court applied the ad
hoc takings analysis, finding that no taking had occurred and no
compensation was due. 54 The district court reasoned that the "economic
155
impact of the regulation on Plaintiffs is nill.'
The case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.156 The
Fifth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the client's ability to possess,
control, and dispose of the IOLTA-generated interests were valuable
property rights for which compensation was due.157 On this basis, the
Fifth Circuit declared the Texas IOLTA program to be
unconstitutional.1 58
The Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's application of the ad hoc
test, reasoning instead that the U.S. Supreme Court had suggested that
59 The Fifth
the per se test was the appropriate analysis in Phillips.1
Circuit recognized that when applying the takings clause to interest
income, the Webb's Court had cited the Penn Central ad hoc test, but had
not itself engaged in an ad hoc analysis.' 6 Instead, the Webb's Court

151. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found. 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
152. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 2d 624 (W.D. Tex.

2000).
153. Id. at 636,646-47.
154. Id. at 647.
155. Id. at 646.
156. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2001).
157. ld.at 187-88, 195.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 186 ("We conclude... Webb's FabulousPharmaciesInc. v. Beckwith, and Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., cases the PhillipsCourt relied upon in reaching its property
interest holding, compel applying the per se analysis.") (internal citations omitted).
160. Id.
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actually utilized the early form of the per se approach.'61 In doing so, the
Webb's Court also dispelled the notion that the per se test can only apply
to real property. 62 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit was free to decide that the
forced contribution of interest income does more than simply adjust the
"benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."' 63
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit was compelled by the language in the
Lucas case, which suggested that the Loretto per se analysis applied to
permanent invasions "no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter
how weighty the public purpose behind it."'" Because the Loretto Court
refused to allow a "permanent invasion" without just compensation, the
Fifth Circuit by analogy held that the refusal of the Webb's Court to
allow confiscation of interest income was applicable to the IOLTA
was appropriate for analyzing the
program. 65 Therefore, the per se test
66
interest.
IOLTA-generated
of
status
The defendants in Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation also
attempted to preclude the finding of an automatic taking by arguing that
United States v. Sperry Corp.'67 applied.168 Sperry, a takings case,
involved the United States government collecting a "user fee" on a
portion of the money recovered by American claimants before the IranUnited States claims tribunal. 169 The U.S. Supreme Court found there
was no taking and rejected governmental appropriations of money being
subjected to the per se analysis. 170 However, the Phillips Court also
foreclosed any argument on this basis by clearly distinguishing Sperry
from the IOLTA cases:
This would be a different case if the interest income generated by
IOLTA accounts was transferred to the State as payment "'for
services rendered" by the State [as was the case with Sperry]. Our
holding does not prohibit a State from imposing reasonable fees it
incurs in generating and allocating interest income. But here the

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 186-87 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 186 (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980)).
Id. at 186-87 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).).
Id.
at 186-88.
Id. at 188.
493 U.S. 52 (1989).
Tex EqualAccessto Justice Found, 270 F.3d at 187, discussing Sperry, 493 U.S. 52.
Sperry, 493 U.S. at 55-58.
Id. at 62, n.9.
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State does not, indeed cannot, argue that its confiscation of [a
client's] interest income amounts to a fee for services performed. 1 '
In addition, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Webb's Court had
concisely dispelled the notion that the per se test can apply only to real
property.'7 2 Therefore, any argument that the appropriation of money is
subject only to the ad hoc analysis was incorrect. In its discussion of the
final element of the takings analysis, whether or not just compensation
was due, the court addressed the variety of possible compensable
property rights. 73 While the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for a
determination of the appropriate compensation,'7 4 it did recognize that
even if the interest income itself was not economically beneficial, there
was nonetheless value in the rights to possess, control, and dispose of
interest income. 75 In sum, because the Texas IOLTA program satisfied
all of the Fifth Amendment elements, the Fifth Circuit held that it was
unconstitutional.
2.

The Ninth CircuitPanel Decision in Washington Legal Foundation
v. Legal Foundation of Washington

Amidst its pursuit to bring down the IOLTA programs, the
Washington Legal Foundation also launched an attack in Washington
State. t7 6 A federal district court, lacking the benefit of the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Phillips, dismissed the claim reasoning that IOLTAgenerated interest was not private property."7 However, a Ninth Circuit
panel in Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of
171. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 171 (1998) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
172. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 187 (5th Cir.
2001).
173. Id. at 188-89.
174. Id. at 195.
175. Id. at 187-88.
176. See Legal Found. of Wash. H, 271 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2001). The facts of Washington
Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington I & 11 are somewhat unusual in that the
Washington Legal Foundation joined a number of plaintiffs who were either Limited Practice
Officers (LPOs) or their clients-and were not associated with attorneys or law firms in any way.
LPOs are generally real estate closing officers who are allowed to perform limited legal practices. Id.
at 1102-03. Through a relatively recent amendment to the state's IOLTA program, LPOs are also
required to abide by the IOLTA rules. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit noted that while the case was
factually different from most IOLTA challenges, it made no difference in the analysis of whether
IOLTA is constitutional. Id. at 869-70.
177. Id. at 873.
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Washington [hereinafter

Legal Foundation of Washington

j17,8

79

acknowledged a property right to interest income under Phillips.' The

Legal Foundation of Washington I court applied a per se takings
analysis, finding that Washington's IOLTA program was
unconstitutional.'S°
Having first established the fact that IOLTA-generated interest was
private property of the client, as compelled by Phillips,the Ninth Circuit
panel next addressed the takings issue.'' Again, the defendants argued
that there was no "physical invasion of tangible property, 18 2 and
therefore the Penn Central ad hoc analysis should apply. 8 3 However, the
court found that the Penn Central case would be inapplicable to the
IOLTA question because it would result in the "nonsensical proposition
that a taking would less readily be found if a state entirely confiscated
people's money from their bank accounts or IRAs than if it installed a
sign on their land."'8 4 Instead, the court found the per se Loretto
approach to be the more appropriate test.1'8 The Ninth Circuit panel
recognized that the Phillips Court had interpreted Loretto to mean that
property was taken "even when infringement of that right arguably
increasedthe market value of the property at issue."18 6
In addition, the Ninth Circuit pannel noted that the rights to possess,
control, and dispose are valuable property rights," 7 foreclosing the
argument that no property right of independent value had been infringed.
The court noted, for example, that the holder of the principal's right to
control what group will receive the interest generated from their
particular principal is valuable, and may be compensable in relation to
the property owner's political, religious, or social beliefs. 8 Furthermore,
the loss of the ability to further invest the interest income might be the
primary concern for other property holders.18 9 Finally, the court found
178. Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash. 236 F.3d 1097, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2001)
[hereinafter Legal Found. of Wash. I].
179. Legal Found of Wash. 1, 236 F.3d at 1108-09.
180. d at 1110-12.
181. Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 877-80.
182. lId
at 878.
183. Id.
184. Id (emphasis in original).
185. Id. at 879.
186. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998). (emphasis in original).
187. Wash. Legal Found i, 271 F.3d at 874 (citing Phillips,524 U.S. at 170).
188. d at 877-78.
189. See, e.g., id.
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that a per se taking had occurred because all of the interest of the IOLTA
fund had been appropriated, just as it is a per se taking to permanently
commandeer property by physical invasion.' 90 On this basis, the Ninth
Circuit panel held Washington's IOLTA program to be unconstitutional
without just compensation.' 19
IV. LEGAL FOUNDATION OF WASHINGTON 11 CREATES A
CIRCUIT SPLIT
Because of the highly contested nature of this issue, the Ninth Circuit
agreed to an en banc rehearing. In its decision, Legal Foundation of
Washington II, the Ninth Circuit vacated most of the panel decision and
instead held that although IOLTA-generated interest is clearly the private
property of the client, the IOLTA program is nonetheless
constitutional.'92 The court utilized the Penn Central ad hoc analysis.' 93
After balancing the factors, the Ninth Circuit held that Washington's
IOLTA program did not impose an unconstitutional taking.' 94
Furthermore, the court held that no just compensation would be due,
even if it could be proved that property was taken. 95 However, the
decision was not unanimous and a scathing dissent, authored by Judge
the debate over what constitutes a proper analysis of
Kozinski, furthers
196
this issue.
A.

Majority Opinion

1.

IOLTA Interest is Client Property Under Washington Law

The Ninth Circuit first acknowledged its required adherence to the
Phillips holding, reiterating that IOLTA-generated interest is the private
property of the client. 97 The defendants argued that Washington law did

190. Id. at 879, 884.

191. Id.
192. Legal Found. of Wash. II, 271 F.3d 836, 864 (9th Cir. 2001).

193. Id. at 857-61.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 861-64.
196. See id. at 864-67 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The dissent was joined by Judges Trott,
Kleinfeld and Silverman. Id. at 864.
197. See id. at 852-53. While the court stated that it rejected the "trifurcated" approach to the
Fifth Amendment takings issue (i.e., breaking the Fifth Amendment down into its component parts,

794
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not create a property right in interest income because Washington's
property law did not include the "interest follows principal" mandate and
the IOLTA statute itself abrogated any property right to IOLTA
interest. 9 However, the court held that Washington's common law did
include the "interest follows principal" doctrine, and this principle had
been adopted by Washington's reception statute.'99 Additionally, the
Ninth Circuit held that because there could be no interest without the
principal, the property interest at issue in the IOLTA context included
both the interest and the principal together."0
Furthermore, the IOLTA statute could not abrogate this property right
under the Ninth Circuit's holding in Schneider v. CaliforniaDepartment
of Corrections." In Schneider, a California statute provided that interest
earned on prison inmate trust accounts would go to an "inmate welfare
fund" instead of the owner of the principal. 2 2 The Ninth Circuit,
following the Phillips rule that interest income is the property of the
principal holder, held that "constitutionally protected property rights can
-and often do-exist despite statutes ... that appear to deny their
existence. ' The Schneider court recognized that the rule that interest
follows principal is at the core of constitutionally protected values.2 °
Therefore, while the statute enacting the IOLTA program attempted to
deny that IOLTA-generated interest was the property of the client, it
could not deny this constitutionally protected property right. 5
2,

PerSe v. Ad Hoc Analysis

Having set the stage for a true takings analysis, the Ninth Circuit next
20 6
addressed the issue of whether it should apply the per se or ad hoc test.
supra, note 54 and accompanying text) in favor of a holistic approach, it nonetheless proceeded to
engage in a "trifurcated" analysis. Id. at 841, 852-64.
198. Id at 852.
199. Id. at 853; WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.04.010 (2001) "[T]he common law, so far as it is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of the state of Washington, nor
incompatible with the institutions and condition of society in this state, shall be the rule of decision
in all the courts of this state"). See also City of Seattle v. King County, 762 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding Washington does adhere to common law "interest follows principal" rule).
200. Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 .3d at 853.
201. 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
202. ld at 1195.
203. Id at 1199 (emphasis in original).
204. Id. at 1201
205. See id. at 853.
206. Id. at 854-57.
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The court reasoned that a per se analysis has rarely been applied outside
the realm of real property and is not relevant to the questions of fungible
property, including cash and accounts. 2 7 Therefore, use of the ad hoc
approach was compelled. 2 8 The Ninth Circuit noted that the Webb's
Court used the Penn Central ad hoc test in its analysis of the Fifth
Amendment rights of fungible interest income.20 9 In addition, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the Penn Central test was created for just such a
situation-where the government's "interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good. 210
According to the Penn Central ad hoc analysis, a taking can only be
found if the regulation goes so far as to "force some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole." 211 Penn Central created three standards to be
considered and balanced in determining whether or not a regulation has
gone too far: 1) the regulation's economic impact on the claimant, 2) the
extent of the regulation's interference with the claimant's investmentbacked expectations, and 3) the character of the government's actions in
enacting the regulations.2 2
In applying these standards to the Washington IOLTA program, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the regulation did not go too far and
therefore did not violate the takings clause.2 3 First, the court stated that
the regulation did not economically impact the claimant because the
client funds would not earn interest without the IOLTA program.214 In
addition, the court noted that no other non-pecuniary loss had been
adequately proven.215 Similarly, in addressing the second factor involving
investment-backed expectations, the Ninth Circuit again determined that
the funds were incapable of earning interest without IOLTA intervention
and thus the claimants had no investment-backed expectation. 216 With
regard to the third factor, which concerns the character of the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 854 (relying on one footnote in the Sperry case, 493 U.S. at 62, n.9). See supranote 15.
See id. at 857.
Id.at 855.
Id.(citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123.
Id. at 124.
Legal Found of Wash. 11, 271 F.3d at 857-61.
Id. at 857-60.
Id.
at 858.
Id.
at 860.
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government action, the court found that the IOLTA program was not out
of character for the commercial industry or the professions they affect
industry. 7 Finally, the court recognized that the government is merely
limited to keeping regulations "just and fair.' 2 "5 The court noted that the
appellants were not being singled out to bear the burden of greater
society, but instead were essentially paying their dues as participants in
the legal system. 219 Thus, under an ad hoc analysis, the Ninth Circuit held
that Washington's IOLTA program was constitutional.
3.

Just Compensation

Having found that Washington's IOLTA program did not constitute a
regulatory taking, the Ninth Circuit still addressed the "just
compensation" issue in dicta." Even if property was being taken by the
regulation, the court stated that the IOLTA program would nonetheless
be constitutional because no just compensation would be due.22 Just
compensation must put the "owner of the condemned property in as good
2
a position pecuniarily as if the property had not been taken.' 2
Furthermore, incidental losses often do not require just compensation. 2'
Because the real question was whether the owner has lost and not
whether has the taker gained, 4 the Ninth Circuit decided that it was
appropriate to address what advantages the plaintiffs would have enjoyed
had their funds not been subject to the IOLTA programL3 At most, the
plaintiffs lost the right to keep their principal from earning interest,
which the court found was a right without economic value.' 6 Therefore,
according to the Ninth Circuit, no just compensation would be due and

217. Id. at 861.
218. Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,66 -67 (1979)).
219. Id.
220. See id at 861-64. Even if the per se or ad hoc elements are present, the taking of personal
property by the government is constitutional if just compensation has been paid to the property

owmer. Id. at 861.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 862 (citing United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979)).
223. Id. (citing Winn v. United States, 272 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1959)).
224. Id. (citing Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
225. Ik
226. ld. In response to the defendants' contention that clients have the right to prevent the accrual
of interest on their principal, the court clarified that the property to be addressed included the
combination of the interest plus the principal, following the reasoning in Phillips and Webb's. Id. at
854.
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no constitutional violation had occurred even if the regulations somehow
constituted a taking.227
B.

Dissent

A four-judge dissent took the majority to task on all aspects of its
analysis except the concession that IOLTA-generated interest is client
property. 228 The dissent accused the majority of following the reasoning
of the dissenting opinions in Phillips, while ignoring the analysis of the
majority opinion. 229 The dissent attacked the reasoning that money,
because it is fungible, is different from other forms of property. 2 0 The
dissent concluded that this was a nonsensical basis for applying the ad
hoc test."l Using an illustration involving a Renoir painting, the dissent
argued that a property owner will suffer the same pecuniary loss when
the government takes a Renoir painting, so called "real property," as
when the government takes an equal value in cash. 2 "For the purposes
of the takings clause," the dissent stated, "real and personal property are
reduced to their cash equivalents." ' Therefore, according to the dissent,
it would be "peculiar and quite dangerous to say that the government has
greater latitude when it takes money than when it takes other kinds of
234
property.
The dissent also attacked the majority's utilization of the Penn Central
23
ad hoc test as opposed to the more appropriate Loretto per se test, 5
stating that "contrary to the majority's assertion, it is not true that a court
is free to choose whether it prefers the ad hoc approach or the per se
approach in taking cases. Rather, the two approaches reflect different
solutions to different problems. ' '2 6 The dissent reasoned that the Penn
227. Id. at 864.
228. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 866 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
233. Id.
234. Id. ("This portion of the majority's opinion will doubtless be greeted with a rousing cheer by
government officials who will eagerly look to bank accounts and other places where money is kept,
with an eye to snatching a few dollars here and there, and justifying it with some sort of 'ad hoc'
analysis."). But note that it has long been settled that taxes do not constitute a Fifth Amendment
taking. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 877-78.
(Beezer, J.,
dissenting) (9th Cir. 1991).
235. Wash. Legal Found.11, 271 F.3d at 865. (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
236. Id.
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Central's ad hoc balancing test is only applicable when the court is
dealing with a regulatory taking, "where the government does not take
property outright, but rather, limits the owner's use of the property for a
regulatory purpose. ' 7 For the dissent, it is only in the rare case when a
regulation goes too far that compensation is due under the ad hoc test."3
The dissent noted that the ad hoc analysis "has never been applied to a
case where the government actually takes and uses the property in
question." ' 9 Instead, the dissent argued that the U.S. Supreme Court in
Loretto held "the physical taking of any property by the government or
its agents is a compensable taking, even if the property owner gets an
offsetting-or even a net-benefit. 24 0
The dissent also disputed the majority's contention that there are
certain types of property that may be taken without just compensation,
stating that no case law exists to support this alarming proposition.2 41 The
dissent argued that the majority appeared to adopt the Phillips dissent by
holding that "if the property owner would not have realized the value of
the property but for the government's actions, then the government can
take it and pay the owner nothing. '24 2 The dissent argued that this
holding ignored the Phillips majority, which clearly recognized that there
are other property interests, aside from economic value, that warrant just
compensation.243 'While the interest income at issue here may have no
economically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and
disposition are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property."2 4
The Phillips majority stated, "[t]he government may not seize rents
received by the owner of a building simply because it can prove that the
costs incurred in collecting the rents exceed the amount collected."245
Similarly, the dissent argued that it is insufficient to justify the
compulsory IOLTA program on the basis that the costs incurred in
setting up a separate interest bearing account for client monies exceed
the amount of interest that they would generate on their own. 246 This
237. Id..
238. Id. (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987)).
239. Id. at 865-66. (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
240. Id. at 866 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
241. Id. at 864. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
242. Id at 865 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
243. Id.
244. Id. (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998)).
245. Id.
246. Id.
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basis ignores the valuable property rights of possession, control and
disposal.247
Through its nearly fifteen years in existence, Washington's IOLTA
program has generated a substantial amount of funding for public service
groups throughout the state.248 However, because IOLTA programs
across the country have come under significant fire in recent years for
alleged constitutional violations, 249 Washington's program should be
inspected very closely. While the Ninth Circuit has held Washington
state's program to not be unconstitutional, Phillips, Texas Equal Access
to Justice Foundation, and previous takings jurisprudence seem to
compel a different analysis5 0 A more appropriate application of the
Fifth Amendment cases to Washington's IOLTA program is discussed
below.
V.

WASHINGTON'S IOLTA PROGRAM IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The Ninth Circuit's en banc analysis of the IOLTA takings issue is
fatally flawed for a number of reasons.5 While the majority correctly
concluded that IOLTA interest is the private property of the client as
required by Phillips,the court failed to adopt the more appropriate per se
takings analysis.5 2 In addition, while the Ninth Circuit correctly asserted
that Phillips only found that interest income is private property, 3 it
ignored the Phillips suggestion in dicta that the Loretto per se approach
is the more appropriate analysis for the IOLTA issue. 254 Applying the
correct analysis to the facts at issue in Washington Legal Foundation v.
Legal Foundation of Washington leads to the conclusion that
Washington's IOLTA program works an unconstitutional taking of client
property without just compensation.5 However, there are constitutional

247. Id.
248. Legal Found. of Wash. I, 236 F.3d 1097, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2001).
249. See supra notes 20-23.
250. See supra Part II.C, Part III.A.2, Part III.B.1.
251. See supra Part IV.B.2.
252. Legal Found. of Wash. II, 271 F.3d 835, 854-57 (9th Cir 2001)
253. See id. at 845.
254. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1998).
255. See supra Part III.C. (discussing the correct analysis of this issue in the Ninth Circuit's initial
panel decision).

Washington's IOLTA Program
alternatives for maintaining the important legal work IOLTA currently
funds 5 6
A.

Characterizationof IOLTA-Generated Interest.

The Ninth Circuit correctly applied the Phillips holding, which
required that IOLTA-generated interest be regarded as the private
property of the client 57 However, in further characterizing the type of
property at issue, the majority attempted to distinguish interest income
z8
from real and personal property on the basis that money is "fungible."
The court did so in an attempt to preempt the application of the per se
test to the IOLTA facts.259 However, this argument is inappropriate and
unnecessary in the IOLTA context. Fungible property should be
considered legally indistinguishable from real property for the purposes
of this analysisi ° because the U.S. Supreme Court has been clear that a
per se taking occurs anytime there is a "permanent physical
occupation." 61 This principal should apply regardless of the type of
property interest at stake.
The Ninth Circuit's argument that fungible property is distinguishable
from real property for the purposes of a takings analysis is based on one
footnote appearing in United States v. Sperry Corp.262 While the Sperry
Court rejected the application of the Loretto per se takings analysis on
the basis that money is fungible, Sperry contemplates a factual scenario
very different from IOLTA takings issue.263 The takings issue in Sperry
surrounded the appropriation of a "user fee" by the United States
government from money recovered by American citizens from the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal. 264 But as Phillips stated, interest income
is not analogous to a "fee. 265 Phillips distinguished Sperry from the
IOLTA context by noting that there had never been any dispute that the
IOLTA program would be constitutional if couched in terms of a

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See infra Part V.D.
See supraPart IV.A.1.
Legal Found. of Wash. H1,271 F.3d 835, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id.
See id. at 866 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982).

262. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62, n.9 (1989).
263. See id.
264. I at 54.

265. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 171 (1998).
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"fee." 266 On this basis, Phillips foreclosed the argument that Sperry

disallowed the application of the per se analysis to fungible property.267
While the Ninth Circuit held that the property at issue in this case
included both the interest income and the underlying principal,268 this
characterization is incorrect. Although the court correctly noted that
"without the principal, there would be ... no property right in that
interest,"269 it overlooked a very important fact. In both Phillips and
Webb's, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that interest income
constitutes a property interest above and beyond the principal. 270 The
Court considered and discussed the rights surrounding interest income
independent from the rights surrounding the principal."z1 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit contradicted prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent when it
refused to consider interest income apart from the principal.
B.

Ad Hoc vs. PerSe Analysis

Having established that interest is indeed property, the inquiry shifts
to selecting the appropriate takings test: either the per se takings analysis
or the ad hoc takings analysis.272 The Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied
the ad hoc takings analysis. 273 Because the per se analysis must be
applied when there is a permanent physical occupation and the entire
subject property has been confiscated, it is the correct approach for the
purposes of the IOLTA issue. 274
The Ninth Circuit was incorrect when it applied the Penn Central ad
hoc analysis. Application of the ad hoc test to the facts of the IOLTA
program relies on the absurd proposition that the confiscation of money
would be less likely to amount to a taking than the placement of a sign

266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See Legal Found. of Wash. II, 271 F.3d 835, 854 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted70 U.S.L.W.
3580 (U.S. June 10, 2002) (No. 01-1325).
269. Id.
270. See Phillips,524 U.S. at 168, 170; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 164 (1980).
271 Phillips,524 U.S. at 168, 170; Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164.
272. Legal Found of Wash. I1, 271 F.3d at 854.
273. See id. at 865-66. (Kozinksi, J., dissenting). See also Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal
Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2001).
274. Legal Found of Wash. II, 271 F.3d at 865-66. ("The ad hoc approach has never been applied
to a case where the government actually takes and uses the property in question.").
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on someone's real property.' The ad hoc approach is intended for
situations where a regulation has taken away some, but not all, of the
property's economically viable use, 76 as was the case in Penn Central,
where the historic building was not allowed to be further developed, but
could continue its current use.' This is immediately distinguishable
from the facts presented by the IOLTA program. Here, the regulation
takes away all economically viable use of the interest, and results in a
permanent physical occupation of that interest-the client is unable to
regain the interest income, or authorize how it is to be controlled,
possessed
or disposed, all of which are recognized as valuable property
27 8
rights.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit should have applied a per se takings
approach to this issue, as the forced donation of IOLTA-generated
interest amounts to a permanent physical occupation.279 First, because the
IOLTA-generated interest at issue is not simply regulated by the
government, but is confiscated completely, there is a permanent physical
occupation and denial of all economically viable uses."so Even if the
property at issue is characterized to include the underlying principal, the
property would still be subject to the Loretto per se test, because a
permanent physical occupation of the interest income has occurred.2"'
Loretto applies regardless of how minute the property intrusion is, as
long as it constitutes a permanent physical occupation.sa Therefore,
Loretto and Lucas compel the application of the per se analysis to this
particular scenariou'
The per se analysis has been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Phillipsand Webb's.n' Returning again to the cornerstone of the IOLTA
takings analysis, Webb's established that a physical occupation of
275. Legal Found. of Wash. 1,236 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001).
276. Id at 865-66. The application of the Penn Central ad hoc test to situations where there has
been a partial regulatory taking was recently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra
PreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l PlanningAgency, No. 00-1168, 2002 WL 654431, at *12
(U.S. April 23,2002).
277. Supra note 119-25 and accompanying text.
278. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998).
279. Legal Found. of Wash. 1, 236 F.3d 1110-11.
280. See supranote 4.
281. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,434-35 (1982).
282. Id at435.
283. See supraPart II.A.2.
284. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir.
2001).
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interest income can occur for purposes of a takings analysis. 2 85 While
Webb's was decided before Loretto and therefore does not employ the
traditional per se takings analysis set forth in that case, in Webb's the
Court nonetheless engaged in similar arguments, rejecting the balancing
test of the ad hoc approach set forth in Penn Central.8 6 The Court
instead followed United States v. Causby,287 a traditional physical
property occupation case.288 Therefore, the Webb's Court also rejected
the application of the ad hoc analysis and would, by implication, compel
the per se analysis. 28 9 In addition, the Court in dicta in Phillipssuggested
that Webb's and Loretto constitute the appropriate per se analysis to
290
address the IOLTA issue.
Consequently, regardless of the characterization of interest income as
an independent property right or as an inseparable part of the principal,
its confiscation results in a permanent physical invasion. Loretto
demands application of the per se analysis in this situation. This result is
consistent with prior U.S. Supreme Court analyses of takings of interest
income. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should have held that a takings had
automatically occurred under the per se framework.
C.

Because There Is a Taking, Just Compensation is Due

While most cases addressing the "just compensation" portion of the
" ' or have remanded the
IOLTA takings issue have done so only in dicta29
9
2
question to lower courts,
it is nonetheless logical that just
compensation is due if the takings analysis is followed to its rational
conclusion. The Ninth Circuit's argument that no just compensation is
due when a program "creates" the interest income is unconvincing.2 93 To

285. See id.; see also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, Inc., 449 U.S. 155, 163-64
(1980) (analogizing the confiscation to that of private property in the Causby case).
286. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 163-64.
287. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
288. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 163-64.
289. Id.
290. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169 (1998).
291. See, e.g., Legal Found. of Wash. II, 271 F.3d 835, 861-64 (9th Cir. 2001).
292. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found. 270 F.3d 180, 194-95.
(5th Cir. 2001).
293. See Legal Found. of Wash. II, 271 F.3d at 861-63 (stating "In seeking compensation for the
interest their principal earned when deposited in the IOLTA account, [appellants] are in actuality
seeking compensation for the value added to their property by Washington's IOLTA program." Id. at
862)
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the contrary, in Phillips the Supreme Court simply stated that "the State
does nothing to create [IOLTA] value; the value is created by [the
clients'] funds." '
In addition, the Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge the important
property rights of control, possession, and disposal-all of which may be
compensable.295 As the Ninth Circuit correctly noted, the determination
of whether just compensation is due requires returning the owner of the
property to "as good a position pecuniarily as if the property had not
'
been taken."296
While the court may have been correct in determining
that there would be little, if any, just compensation due for confiscation
of the interest income in tangible form, it ignored other important
property rights.2" The rights to possess, control, and dispose of the
interest are rights for which compensation will vary from client to client,
but are compensable nonetheless. 29 For some, the right to control what
group will receive the interest generated from their particular principal is
extremely valuable, and may be compensable in relation to their political,
religious, or social beliefs. 299 For others, the loss of the ability to further
invest the interest income as they choose may be of prime concern. 0 0
While the possibilities of these intangible rights seem endless, it is clear
that they are all compensable in some form or another, even if the
compensation is small.0 1
In addition, intangible property rights are impacted even where the
regulation actually increases the economic value of the property, as is the
case with the IOLTA prograM 30 2 In Phillips the Supreme Court noted
that a taking may be found even when the subject regulation increases
the market value of the property.0 3 The Court stated that "[t]he
government may not seize rents received by the owner of a building
294. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170-71 ("The Federal Government, through the structuring of its
banking and taxation regulations, imposes costs on this value if private citizens attempt to exercise
control over it. waiver of these costs if the property is remitted to the State hardly constitutes
'government-created value."').
295. See id. at 170.
296. Legal Found. of Wash. 1i, 271 F.3d at 862 (citing U.S. v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S.
506,510 (1979)).
297. See supranote 102.
298. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998).
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id.

302. Id.
303. I
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simply because it can prove that the costs incurred in collecting the rents
exceed the amount collected." 304 Because funds that are expected to
generate more fees than interest are automatically subject to the IOLTA
program, they are clearly analogous to the seizure of rents whose
collection costs exceed their proceeds-both of which are prohibited by
the takings clause. 305 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was also incorrect in
holding that just compensation was due for confiscated IOLTA interest.
D.

ConstitutionalAlternatives to the IOLTA System

In sum, because the IOLTA program meets the three elements of a
taking under the Fifth Amendment, the program is unconstitutional in its
current form.30 6 To allow it to continue will disturb the values
surrounding the Fifth Amendment, a price to steep to be paid, regardless
of the value of the particular program. Because IOLTA serves a valid
public need, the debate should now focus on constitutionally acceptable
alternatives.307
Because the idea behind the IOLTA program is quite ingenious, and
the vast majority of clients subjected to its regulation neither feel its
effects, nor are concerned by them, the best alternative is one that will
allow the program to continue substantially unchanged.0 ' To accomplish
this, the Supreme Court of Washington need only make the program
consensual. 30 9 An amendment to the current statute could easily cure the
problem. While the program could remain mandatory for attorneys of the
state, requiring them to place short term or small client funds in IOLTA
accounts, the scope could be constitutionally limited to only those clients
who have consented to the program. The administration of this change
could be as straightforward as an additional consent form included for
client signature when a retainer agreement is signed. Once the client has
been notified of the IOLTA program and informed that the interest that
would otherwise accrue on their funds would not outweigh the
administrative cost to receive it, there will no longer be a constitutional
issue. Perhaps the form could include an explanation that if a client
304. Id.
305. See id.
306. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Legal Found. of Wash. II, 271 F.3d 835, 867 (2001) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
308. See, e.g., Breemer, supranote 113, at 243-45.
309. See Legal Found of Wash. II, 271 F.3d at 867 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); See also Breemer,
supra note 113, at 244-46; supranote 4 and accompanying text.
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refuses, he or she will by default agree to pay the administrative costs of
having the fund maintained in a separate account. In this instance, it
seems plausible that the Legal Foundation of Washington would
continue to receive its much needed funding but would have cured the
important constitutional violation through simple consent.
In the alternative, the Supreme Court of Washington could generate
funds equal to the IOLTA interest by adding an additional fee to the
annual bar dues of the state's licensed attorneys.31 ° As noted in Phillips,
fees have never been alleged as unconstitutional takings-but are instead
considered payment "for services rendered."3 " Here, the service
performed by the additional fee would be the fulfillment of an ethical
obligation on the part of the state's attorneys to render pro bono
assistance to the state's indigent population.31 Through the payment of
these fees, such services can be vicariously accomplished. The fees
as
would then fund the worthwhile legal aid organizations, such
3 13
public.
the
for
service
this
perform
who
Services,
Legal
Columbia
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Washington State's IOLTA program in its current form
violates the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Phillips compels that the interest income
generated from the program be considered the private property of the
client, the principal owner. Because the interest income is confiscated in
its entirety by the government, the necessary per se analysis results in an
automatic Fifth Amendment taking. Furthermore, just compensation is
due for tangible interest itself, as well as intangible rights to possess,
dispose of, and control the interest. Therefore, the IOLTA program is
unconstitutional.

310. Washington State currently has over 22,000 licensed attorneys, each paying between $100
and $350 per year to maintain their license to practice law. See http://www.wsba.org/ (last visitied
July 31, 2002)
311. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 271 F.3d 156, 171 (1998).
312- See WASH.RULFS OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 6.1 (2000):
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer maydischarge this responsibility
by providing professional services at no feeor a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to
public service orcharitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improvingthe
law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial supportfor organizations that
provide legal services to persons of limited means.
313. Id.
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Because the IOLTA program cleverly generates money for public
legal aid organizations with admittedly little harm to the average client, it
is vital that the debate now focus on constitutionally valid alternatives to
or remedies for this program. At the very heart of the issue are the ethical
obligations on all lawyers of the state (as well as the nation) to serve the
public through pro bono or low cost legal service at some point in their
career. Because of these obligations, it is imperative that lawyers now
either discuss the IOLTA program with their clients, and obtain their
consent to participate in the program, or accept an additional fee from the
bar association to meet this valuable need.

